Grief Journal : I Will Always Wonder Who You Would Have Been: Pregnancy, Infant, Baby, and Child Loss ~ 6x9 College Ruled Notebook

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Grief Journal : I Will Always Wonder Who You Would Have Been: Pregnancy, Infant, Baby, and Child Loss ~ 6x9 College Ruled Notebook

Grief Journal : I Will Always Wonder Who You Would Have Been: Pregnancy, Infant, Baby, and Child Loss ~ 6x9 College Ruled Notebook

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Thankfully, I went on to have 2 more beautiful, healthy children. Little did I know that my miscarriage was just the beginning of a very difficult journey. I could write a book on the struggle and turmoil that would be the next part of my efforts to expand my family! But it was all so very worth it. I usually don’t answer, because I assume the one posting the question is looking for guidance from someone older and wiser who can tell her how to know she should prevent further pregnancies, and I don’t have the answer to that. Plus, those are two different questions.

In addition to Thomason, I include Macfarlane ( 2003, 2008, 2014) under this label even though he adopts a Relativist account of future contingents. The reason I include him under the label of Supervaluationism for the purposes of this discussion is because the question we are considering is whether it is appropriate to wonder about a future contingent before the occurrence of the event described by the future contingent. Macfarlane’s account relativizes truth of future contingents to a context of use and a context of assessment. The truth-value of a statement about the future is arrived at by supervaluating over all histories that include the context of use and the context of assessment. When the context of assessment coincides with the context of use, the truth-conditions for an utterance will be the same as the Supervaluationist truth-conditions, and so, to the extent that I think that Supervaluationism faces a problem regarding wondering about future contingents at the context of use, these problems apply equally to MacFarlane’s account. Making truth of future contingents relative to context of use and context of assessment is intended to accommodate retrospective accuracy judgments: judgments after the event described in the utterance has occurred. There are two dates (outside of birthdays) that I will never forget. January 30 and July 19. No matter how hard I try, even when my mind seeks to erase these dates from my memory, my heart knows. January 30, 2012 is the day I lost my precious child. July 19, 2012 is the day he was due to be born. His birthday. I will always wonder, who you would, have been, child baby loss, memorial quote, svg cut files, in memory children, sympathy heaven, brother family son, sister daughter, goodbyes miscarriage, religious angel, sorrow remembranceMacFarlane, J. (2003). Future contingents and relative truth. The Philosophical Quarterly, 53(212), 321–336.

My hope is that our experience brings awareness about such a challenging subject and also allows women experiencing molar pregnancies or other crisis pregnancies to feel less alone. For the life of me, I couldn’t fathom why God would make this a part of our story —we aren’t strangers to hard, but this was beyond any comprehension. Thoughts of you cloud my mind during the most inconvenient times. I think of you when I’m sipping my morning coffee, wondering if you’d take cream in yours. I think of you when I’m in the shower as water is rushing down my face, wondering if I’m the reason nothing ever works out for me. I think of you when I’m alone in a crowded place, wondering if you’d proudly be walking through unknown faces with my hand in yours. But really I wanted to shout at them, "No actually it's not fair, it's not fair that my baby was taken, it's not fair that its little heart stopped beating. Please stop minimising my loss.

Our whole world stopped as doctors saved my life, my body fought, and we said goodbye to our beloved daughter. 

Gummy would have turned 4-years old in a few days. I wonder what he would be like. What would he would look like? I think of the life he would have had and who he would have been. He is not just a memory. He was my son. I was his mother. I was his mother from the moment I found out about him. Knowing you are carrying a life inside of you is a bond like no other. If you’ve ever lost a child, and you have no babies on this earth, you are still a mother. The world may not know it, but you do. I will always consider myself a mother of four. 3 on earth and 1 angel baby in heaven. MacFarlane, J. (2014). Assessment sensitivity: Relative truth and its applications. Oxford University Press. To start, there are some cases in which suspension of judgment becomes epistemically inappropriate exactly when further inquiry does. The view being proposed here can give a straightforward explanation of those cases. For instance, say that at w, the world of inquiry, S realizes that Q has some false presupposition or is similarly unsound, e.g., Q = What colour was Thomas Jefferson’s Ferrari? (and w is the actual world). When S discovers that Q is faulty in this way, it looks as though further inquiry into Q would be irrational or otherwise epistemically inappropriate. But in this sort of case continuing to suspend about Q seems to be inappropriate as well, and in much the same way. If you know that Jefferson didn’t have a Ferrari then suspending judgment about what colour his Ferrari was looks inappropriate (Friedman, 2017, 315–316). I smiled and said, "Well sure that's just life isn't it".Leaving the hospital I felt so numb, so cold, so lonely. My husband put his arm around me, I wrapped my arms tightly around my abdomen. I felt so empty, so hollow. I am doubtful that a theoretically neutral and informative account can be given of what it is for a statement about the future to be presently settled or unsettled, but given that all parties to the debate seem to agree that statements like (EGGS) and (NA24) are the sort of statements at issue, I will focus on them as paradigm examples of future contingents in what follows. Footnote 3

Following Friedman, let us say that a question Q is sound at world w iff there is a proposition that truly and completely answers Q at w (Friedman, 2013, 151). Henceforth I will introduce the following notation: I will reserve uppercase italicized letters to denote questions and lowercase italicized letters to denote propositions. Where Q is a question and a is a proposition, I will use the notation ‘ Q(a)’ to denote a true, complete answer to Q. I can assume without contradiction that my presence in Warsaw at a certain moment of next year, e.g. at noon on 21 December, is at the present time determined neither positively or negatively. Hence it is possible, but not necessary, that I shall be present in Warsaw at the given time. On this assumption the proposition I shall be in Warsaw at noon on 21 December of next year can at the present time be neither true nor false. For if it were true now, my future presence in Warsaw would have to be necessary, which is contradictory to the assumption. If it were false now, on the other hand, my future presence in Warsaw would have to be impossible, which is also contradictory to the assumption. Therefore the proposition considered is at the moment neither true nor false ... (Łukasiewicz 1930, 53). It wasn’t you, as painfully cliché as it is, it’s true. It wasn’t you, it was never you – it was always me. I’m the one who isn’t ready for love. I’m not the one who wants goodbye kisses or to be strolling through the store holding hands, I’m not the one who wants to depend on someone, I’m not the one who is ready to give up my single life where all I know how to do is take up space. Trying to make room for someone else isn’t on my to-do list this week or anytime soon.It may seem that if at moment m it is sensible to wonder whether A, then it must be that either A is settled true at m, or that A is settled false at m. More generally, it may seem that if one is to be able, at m, properly to raise the question whether A, then A must be either settled true or settled false...No matter how things eventuate, the question posed on Monday, “Will there be a sea battle tomorrow?” will be answered. If there is a sea battle on Tuesday, then we may say, “The answer to the question is definitely ‘yes’.”; while if on Tuesday there is no sea battle, then we may say, “The answer to the question is definitely ‘no’.” We should therefore not reject the Monday question as badly posed. It is perfectly correct on Monday to say something like “We cannot yet provide a settled answer to that question, but must wait and see” (Belnap et al., 2001, 176). Here Friedman is discussing suspension of judgment, but I think the very same considerations apply to wondering whether. If I am wondering whether Thomas Jefferson’s Ferrari was red and subsequently learn that my wondering contains a false presupposition, it seems inappropriate for me to continue to wonder whether Thomas Jefferson’s Ferrari was red. These considerations motivate another norm for wondering whether: that it is inappropriate to wonder whether in cases where one learns that the question that serves as the content of one’s wondering is unsound. (WIN2): So, on Todd’s analysis, to wonder whether the sodium-24 atom will decay in the next 24 h is to wonder whether the unique, actual future contains the decay of the sodium-24 atom. On our current framework, the question that serves as the content of my wondering whether attitude would be Does the unique actual future contain the decaying of the sodium-24 atom? Given Todd’s commitment to the nonexistence of a unique actual future, the question falsely presupposes a unique actual future. With respect to questions like this, there are two approaches available: a Russellian approach and a Strawsonian approach. Footnote 24 I will consider each and argue that both entail that if, as Todd claims, there is no unique actual future, then wondering about future contingents is inappropriate. Suppose Arthur wonders whether the present king of France is bald. Extending the Russellian analysis, the question that serves as the content of Arthur’s interrogative attitude, Is the present king of France bald?, does have a true, complete answer. Footnote 25 The true, complete answer is: There does not exist a present king of France. Footnote 26 Once Arthur learns that there is no present king of France, it is no longer appropriate for him to wonder whether the present king of France is bald. On the Russellian analysis, this inappropriateness follows from (WIN1), since learning that there is no present king of France involves learning the true, complete answer to the question. The same applies to wondering about future contingents on Todd’s account. The question that serves as the content of my wondering about (NA24) has a true, complete answer: There does not exist a unique, actual future. In embracing Todd’s account, I come to know the true, complete answer to the question that serves as the content of my wondering and so, by (WIN1), it is inappropriate for me to continue to wonder about it. F \(\upvarphi\) is false at m iff for every h that contains m, F \(\upvarphi\) is unsatisfied at m in h.

As noted above, Todd’s defense of Falsism differs significantly from Prior’s. Todd does not take the falsity of future contingents to be rooted in the fact that ‘will’ is equivalent in meaning to ‘will definitely’ or ‘it is now settled that it will’. Rather he claims that ‘will’ statements presuppose the existence of a unique actual future. Todd claims that future contingent statements of the form ‘It will be the case that p’ are to be anaylzed as: ‘The unique actual future features p’ (Todd, 2016, 789). The reason that all future contingents are false on Todd’s account is because it is false that there is a unique actual future. Following a Russellian analysis of non-denoting definite descriptions, it is false that there will be a sea battle tomorrow because it is false that there is a unique actual future that features one. But writing is therapy for me. And this year, I feel ready to share a part of my life journey that almost destroyed me. Necessarily, if one knows Q(a) at t, then one ought not have an interrogative attitude towards Q at t (Friedman, 2017, 311). In our example, (EGGS) is satisfied in h2 and fails to be satisfied in h1 and h3 because Nicola has eggs for breakfast in h2 and not in h1 and h3. The second step of the process involves supervaluating over histories. A statement is true at m just in case it is satisfied in every history that contains m: My husband and I were so excited about this baby. It was our first child together (I had a daughter from a previous marriage) and he really wanted kids. He asked me on the first date multiple times if I wanted kids! And I was excited to finally give my then 5-year-old a sibling and to have a child with the man I loved.Part of the seriousness related to a molar pregnancy is that traces can cause a cancerous threat to the body, and certain hormone levels would need to be monitored closely as well. Complete molar pregnancies run the risks (many of which I personally endured) of life-threatening hypertension, hyperthyroidism, anemia, hemorrhage, hysterectomy, risk of cancer, and maternal death. Todd, P., & Rabern, B. (2021). Future contingents and the logic of temporal omniscience. Noûs, 55(1), 102–127.

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